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Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 2012 WL 4215921 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
 
Ada C. Montague 
ABSTRACT 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kivalina follows the United States 
Supreme Court’s recent trend in denying the use of federal common law claims for redress of 
damages allegedly caused by greenhouse gas emissions.  Under the doctrine of displacement, the 
court concluded that the concerns raised by the Native Village of Kivalina are addressed under 
the Clean Air Act, precluding a federal common law nuisance claim.  However, the court noted 
that additional analysis by future federal courts may be appropriate in addressing whether 
damages are also displaced. The court did not preclude the possibility for redress under a state 
common law nuisance claim.  The court held that federal common law was not available to 
resolve the issues raised by Kivalina, and that only the legislative and the executive branches 
could provide a remedy.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Kivalina is an appeal of a district court decision sustaining defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1  The defendants (“Energy Producers”) represent almost every 
major oil and gas producer in the United States.2  The plaintiffs (“Kivalina”) argued that global 
warming, caused by the defendants’ production of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, had 
“severely eroded land upon which the city [Kivalina] was situated.”3  Kivalina claimed the 
Energy Producers’ GHG emissions interfered with the plaintiffs’ rights to use and enjoy both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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public and private property.4  Kivalina also asserted a civil conspiracy claim against the Energy 
Producers, claiming they acted in concert “[T]o mislead the public about the science of global 
warming.”5  Kivalina sought damages under the federal common law of nuisance for past GHG 
emissions.  The Ninth Circuit held that Kivalina could not assert a federal nuisance claim 
because the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), a federal legislative action addressing GHG emissions, 
displaces federal common law.6   
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Kivalina is an Alaskan village of 400 residents located on the tip of a barrier reef in 
northwestern Alaska about seventy miles north of the Arctic Circle.7  Ninety-seven percent of the 
villagers are members of the federally recognized tribe of Inupiat Alaskan Natives.8  The village 
is imperiled by increasing erosion due to changes in weather patterns and sea level rise.9  In the 
winter months coastal sea ice forms, protecting the village.10  However, in recent years, the ice 
forms later, breaks up earlier and covers a smaller area.11  In their complaint, the villagers 
alleged that global warming is causing the changes to the sea ice, which in turn, is damaging 
their property.12  They further assumed that defendants are responsible for global warming and 
climate change, due to their participation in producing GHG emissions.13  Kivalina argued the 
production of GHG emissions is a federal and state public nuisance.14  As a result, Kivalina 
asserts that the Energy Producers should bear responsibility for interferences with the villagers’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Id. at 854. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 






13 Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 853. 
14 Id. at 854. 
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property rights.15  Furthermore, they argue that the Energy Producers know about the effects of 
GHG emissions, and are working to actively “mislead the public about the science of global 
warming.”16 Finally, Kivalina seeks damages associated with past GHG emissions and an 
injunction to prevent further current release of GHG emissions. 
The Energy Producers responded to the claim by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.17  They argued that Kivalina raised nonjusticiable political questions and 
furthermore lacked standing.18   
The district court agreed roundly with the Energy Producers and found that the claim of 
federal nuisance could not be resolved because “there was insufficient guidance as to the 
principles or standards that should be employed to resolve the claims at issue.”19  Furthermore, 
reaching a conclusion under the federal common law theory of public nuisance would have 
forced the court to set a standard for GHG emissions, as well as decide who should bear the cost 
for impacts caused by GHG emissions.20  The court found such determinations are legislative 
and executive questions and could not be decided by the judiciary.21  The court also found 
Kivalina lacked standing, as they could not demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” connecting the 
Energy Producers’ conduct to the erosion damaging the village.22  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
reviewed the decision based on whether Kivalina’s argument that GHG emissions released by 
the Energy Producers contribute to global warming and cause a public nuisance is “viable under 
federal common law” or if it has been displaced by legislative action.23   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Id. 
16 Id.; citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (2009). 




21 Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F3d at 854.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 855. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Majority Opinion 
The court held that the test for whether congressional legislation pre-empts federal common 
law claims is to look first at whether any statutes directly address the issue in question and then 
at whether the legislation is a sufficient remedy to the exclusion of federal common law.24  The 
court found that the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) already addresses Kivalina’s claims, and therefore, 
federal common law is displaced.25  It clarified that Kivalina’s claims are unique in that it seeks a 
remedy for past emissions, not an injunction to cease existing ones.26   
In reaching its conclusion that Kivalina’s claims are displaced by the CAA, the court 
considered previous holdings dealing with transboundary pollution where the doctrine of 
displacement was found to be separate from the remedy asserted,27 and where displacement of 
one cause of action would displace all associated remedies.28  The court found that the CAA 
displaced the plaintiff’s claims by already addressing the issue of interstate pollution.29  It next 
concluded that regardless of whether the CAA offered a remedy, the Supreme Court has held it 
would still displace available common law remedies because Congress acted to occupy the field 
by passing the legislation, thereby filling any gap otherwise requiring a common law remedy.30  
Finally, even though the challenged conduct occurred before the Supreme Court held the CAA 
displaces common law claims based on GHG emissions, it was not an issue to retroactively 
applying the decision.31   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 856.  
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 857, citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 484, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2616, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008). 
28 Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856. 
29	  Id.	  at	  857.	  
30	  Id.	  
31	  Id.	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The court stated that there could be cases where “the lack of a federal remedy may be a factor 
to be considered in determining whether Congress has displaced federal common law,”32 
opening a potential for further analysis of whether claims without a remedy may need additional 
attention under the theory of displacement.33  The court held that in this case, however, it did not 
matter that GHG standards set by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) occurred after 
the damage to Kivalina because Congress had “spoken directly” to the issue through legislation, 
which can be retroactively applied.34    
In conclusion, the court echoed the Supreme Court’s previous determination that the CAA 
precluded a federal common law nuisance claim.  As a result, Kivalina’s claim for damages due 
to GHG emissions was effectively displaced by the CAA.35  Furthermore, the court found that 
Kivalina’s civil conspiracy claim “falls with the substantive claim,” and it concluded its analysis 
there.36  The court pointed out that the proper source for a remedy lies with legislative and 
executive branches if the CAA falls short as a remedy for damages caused by GHG emissions.37 
B. Concurring Opinion 
In a detailed concurring opinion, a district judge chronicled the case law developing the 
question of “whether displacement of a claim for injunctive relief necessarily calls for 
displacement of a damages claim.”38  The concurring opinion clearly advocates for the traditional 
application of the displacement doctrine, where if the federal common law is displaced then so is 
any claim for damages.39  The opinion notes that Exxon departs from the other cited case law, 
holding instead that the “Court has rejected ‘attempts to sever remedies from their causes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Id., citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 1392, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972). 
33 Id., citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314, 325, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1791, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981). 
34 Id. citing Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
35 Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858. 
36 Id. 
37 Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858. 
38 Id. at 859. 
39 Id. at 861. 
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action.’”40  The concurrence clarifies that while federal law cannot sever damages from a claim 
otherwise precluded by displacement, state law can when an injunctive remedy is sought.41  The 
concurrence argues, “[d]isplacement of the federal common law does not leave those injured by 
air pollution without a remedy.  Once federal common law is displaced, state nuisance law 
becomes an available option to the extent it is not preempted by federal law.”42   
The concurrence agreed with the lower court’s holding that Kivalina did not have standing.43  
The concurrence added that Kivalina was not able to “plausibly trace their injuries to the 
Appellees.”44  It concludes that a private party should not be able to “pick and choose amongst 
all the greenhouse gas emitters throughout history to hold liable for millions of dollars in 
damages.”45  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Kivalina opens wide the door for state court actions on the issue of nuisance due to global 
warming.  However, standing will remain a daunting barrier for the village of Kivalina in 
asserting a state nuisance claim.  The court provides small hope in its discussion of non-
remediable claims.  The court hints that, if there is no federal remedy, perhaps the CAA is not 
sufficient for addressing GHG emissions.  Further case law at the federal level is necessary, 
however, to provide the missing analysis to reach that conclusion.  It appears the concurring 
opinion would like to see that opportunity extinguished. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Id. at 862, citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008). 
41 Native Village of Kivalina 696 F.3d at 862, citing Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255–56, 104 
S.Ct. 615, (pinpoint) 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). 
42 Navitve Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 866. 
43 Id. at 867. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 869.	  
